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COMMENTA TOR
SoiJth Dakota State University
Power Doregylatiofi:
Blessing or Curse
Qary Taylor
Assistant Professor
of Economics
The plight of California has been a topic of
much discussion In the last few weeks. The
problems there have become almost synonymous
with the evils of market deregulation. Is this
comparison justified? Was the California power
market truly deregulated or Is the current situation a
result of excessive government Intervention? A
clear understanding of the situation that exists In
California is necessary to make an informed
decision regarding the future of power deregulation
In other parts of the U.S.
Tbe California Situation
The problem In California was born In 1996
when the state legislature enacted a regulatory plan
that partially deregulated the price of electriolty.
This process allowed consumers access to power
from out of area, and out of state, suppliers. This
policy change was forced by a demand Increase of
30% over the last ten years while supply only
increased 6%. During this same time period
consumer/ environmentalist activism prevented the
building of any new power generating facilities.
These groups of activists were dubbed BANANAS -
- Build Absolutely Nothing .Anywhere Near Anyone -
" by former Delaware Govemor Pete du Font.
This increase In competition should, In
tbeoiy, drive prices down. The problem Is that
while wfiolesale electricity prices were allowed to
fluctuate, consumer prices were frozen. This
meant that while the producers of electricity were
allowed to pass along the Increases In their costs of
production, the prices that utilities were allowed to
(Continued on p. 2)
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South Dakota's
Hog Market
Mafthaw A. Diersan
Assistant Professor
& Extension Specialist
Producers, lenders, and others have
expressed Interest in the future profitability of hogs
and In marketing Issues such as basis and hedging
effectiveness. In this Commentator, a couple of
Issues related to South Dakota's hog market are
examined. Raising hogs and pigs Is generally
South Dakota's second largest livestock enterprise
based on sales revenue, lagging behind raising
beef cattle. The number of farms producing hogs
has declined in recent years, but South Dakota
ranked 11*' among U.S. states inhog Inventory and
ranked 12'^ In pig crop size In 2000.^
Despite a decline In the number of sows In
South Dakota, the number of hogs marketed has
Increased. The pig crop declined, but Inshlpments,
presumably of feeder pigs, have made up the
difference as shown In Figure 1, Tfie ability to use
existing facilities and relatively Inexpensive feed are
potential causes. An industry-wide trend toward
specialization Is perhaps another factor explaining
the trend. Is there room for growth in South
Dakota's hog markets? Recent growth from
Inshlpments of feeder pigs implies that South
Dakota may have a comparative advantage where
finishing hogs Is concerned. Feed cost should be
relatively low, as the price of corn Is typically the
lowest in the U.S. along the 1-29 corridor In South
Dakota.
Another Issue Is basis, the difference
between cash and futures prices. Basis Is
Important because It determines how the futures
prices should be adjusted for planning purposes
and for comparing futures and options with any
(Continued on p,3}
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charge consumers wore frozen for six years. This
law was written at a time when generation coats for
electricity were decreasing. The unforseen
Increases in the costs of producing electnolty could
not be recouped by the utility companies, forcing
them to the verge of bankruptcy. State rules forced
companies to buy power at $.15 to $1.00 per
kilowatt hour but retail prices were capped at $.067
per kilowatt hour, (Taylor)
The Theory of Deregulatton
in most cases the local power company
operates In a monopoly situation. Since they are
ttie oniy supplier of electricity, the usual market
response is to produce iess than the optimai
amount of electricity and charge a price higher than
the tree market equilibrium. This misaiiocatlon of
resources arrd transfer of consumer surplus to
producers are the usual reasons for regulation.
The job of the regulatory body is to try to balance
the Interests of the consumer (low prices, product
variety, and quality of service), while etill
maintaining the economic viabiiity of the producer,
(Fisher and Dombusch) In order to satis% these
interests some guidelines should be followed. First,
marginal cost pricing should be followed as closely
as possible. Second, the pricing and service
requirements should allow the utility to obtain a
"normal" rate of return on the capital it has
Invested. Finally, power should be produced In an
efficient manner. This rate of retum should be
approximately what could be earned by investing
the capital In the next most attractive alternative, A
competitive rale of return is necessary to allow
producers to update generating facilities and lines
and maintain a reasonable mtum to their investors.
History shows that deregulation of a market
allows the influx of new compeHtors v/ho see an
opportunity to reap profits and introduce a cxjndition
where the forces of supply and demand determine
prices. As supplies increase, prices are driven
down and as consumer demand increases, prices
Increase, Such an increase in competitton will
force utilities to t>ecome more efficient producers
and reduce the prices customers pay. Freeing the
market in California would have initially resulted In
Increased consumer prices but it would have also
brought consumer demand closer to actual
supplies, encouraging conservation measures and
new construction of power plants. As new
participants enter the market, prices would have
gone down and consumers would have gained new
choices for their power supply. The partial
deregulation plan that was purmed In California
resulted in deteriorating service and rolling
blackouts, and has caused severe economic
hardship to both businesses and private Individuals.
Lessons for the Futyre
As we look at the problem of deregulation
and its effect on markets, there are sortie lessons
to be learned. The results of the partial
deregulation in California should be no surprise.
We have seen the same results in the former
Soviet Union, yaintalning price controls In the
domestic market while paying free market prices for
goods and resources needed for production and
consumption drove the USSR Into bankruptcy. We
are seeing the same situation being replayed in
California. Paying high prices for inputs and having
output prices capped is a recipe for failure. The
second thing to be learned here Is that giving
consumers what they want may be politically
expedient in the short run, but may be very costly in
the long run. Consumers In California have
demanded cheap electricity. However, at some
point the bills for providing cheap power will come
due. The laws of economics cannot be suspended.
We are seeing the results now. Consumers are
facing disruptions In power supplies as well as a
future of higher power prices as the state bails out
the floundering utility companies. The final lesson
from this process is to take the lime to thoroughly
examine a problem before proposing a solution and
examine both the intended and unintended results
of the policy. The externalities created must also
be accounted for. The intended result of the law,
iow power prices for consumers, was achieved.
However, the unintended resuits, utilities on the
verge of banknjptcy and lack of generation
facilities, were not anticipated. This doesn't mean
that deregulation will not work; ItJust needs to be
carefully evaluated on a case by case basis.
Due to different resource allocations,
managerial abilities, and consumer needs, what
fails in one situation may be a great success
somewhere else. Adequate study and analysis
prior to implementation is much easier than trying
to solve a preventable problem later. The problems
facing California should not deter other states.
Including South Dakota, from pursuing
deregulation. There are also examples of
successful utility deregulation. Pennsylvania is a
good example. By truly deregulating the electricity
market In that state, consumers have been the
recipients of lower prices and better service.
Markets that are allowed to work freely do a better

Job of allocating resources and discovering prices
than regulated ones. The key is to allov^ them
sufficient freedom and time to achieve a stable
equilibrium and to allow consumers to make
informed decisions regarding their purchases.
Sooroes
Fischer, Stanley and Dombusch, Rudlgsr. Economics.
McGraw-Hill, 1983. p, 279
Taylor. Jerry. "California's 8urn-ouf, National Review
Orrline, February 7, 2001.
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forward prices. The difference between cash prices
can also be compared, giving a location basis. The
weekly average price for market hogs in Sioux
Falls, reported by USDA-AMS, was compared to
the CME Lean Hog index on expiration dates from
1997 to 2000 For months without a contract, the
index value was from the business day of the
month, the day futures contracts typically expire.
As shown In Table 1, the basis in Sioux Fails was
usualiy negative, but ranged from ~$7.27 to $4.22.
A basis level of -$2.00 Implies that for any observed
futures price, the implied Sioux Fails' cash price is
obtained by subtracting $2.00, then converting to a
cash price by multiplying the result by 0.74. (The
Index is on a dressed basis and the dressing
percer^tage for butcher hogs Is about 74 percent of
its live weight).
Sales revenue from hogs In South Dakota
climbed back to around $280 million in 2000. What
that means In terms of future profitability is difficult
to assess, given the equity-draining prices of late
1998, Tfie prospects seem to raise as many
questions as answers.^ However, given the move
toward year-round, continuous operations, there Is
possibly a niche to exploit given the continued
seasonal demand fluctuation (and higher prices) for
pork.
' USDA-NASS annually rspoUs numbers such as inshlpmefXs,
farm slaughta~, and deaths in the Msat Animals Productbn,
Dispo$itk>rs. and Inaome report,
^For a morederailed discus$ior> see Oiersen, M.A. South
Dakota 's Hog Market: Qavatogn^nta and Prospects.
Ecx»nomiGs Staff Paper 2001-2, Economics Department South
Dakota State University, Brookings, South Dakota, March
2001.
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Table L Basis at Esplratloa for Sloax Falls' C^^asli and CME LH index
fun
($/c\vt. lean)
-7.27 3.17
-4.62 -3.63
-4.20 -3.93
-3.12 -4.46
Ang Sep Oct Nov DecYear Jan
1997
1998
1999
2000
-2.11
-0.83
o •^'*5
-3./5
-2.43
-5.81
-2.87
-3.71
-0.40
-1.68
-4.20
-1.95
-0.60
-0.51
-4.23
-2.37
-0.43
-1.92
-3.99
-3.28
-2 36
4.22
-3.42
-5.13
-3.89
2.30
0.09
-3.12
-1.01
-5.40
-2.52
-0.83
-1.55
-4.21
-0.14
-2.57
Note: Cash is lean equivalent of D.S, 1-2,230-250# slaughter barrows and gilts price.
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